Online market entry: the motivations for imitation across retailer types by Bhatnagar, Amit et al.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2522084 
1 
 
Online Market Entry: The Motivations for Imitation across Retailer Types  
 
 
Amit Bhatnagar  
School of Business Administration 
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee 
Milwaukee, WI 53201 
amit@uwm.edu 
Ph: 414-229-2520 
 
 
Ralitza Nikolaeva  
ISCTE Business School 
Lisbon University Institute 
Av. das Forças Armadas 
1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal 
ralitza.nikolaeva@iscte.pt 
Ph: +351 21 7903437 
 
 
Sanjoy Ghose 
School of Business Administration 
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee 
Milwaukee, WI 53201 
sanjoy@uwm.edu 
Ph: 414-229-4224 
  
 
Accepted at Managerial and Decision Economics 
  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2522084 
2 
 
Abstract 
  
This study examines the motivations for imitation in retailers’ online channel entry. 
Extant literature suggests that legitimacy and efficiency are the primary motivators for 
firms to imitate. We develop hypotheses which center on the belief that not all firm types 
would use the same motivator for deciding to imitate and enter the online market; 
legitimacy would be the driving force for some retailer types while efficiency would be 
the motivator for others. We test our hypotheses on a unique data collected from multiple 
sources. Our findings confirm that the motivators for imitation vary across retailer types.   
 
 
Keywords: Imitative Behavior, Online Retailing, Legitimacy, Efficiency, Channel Entry. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of incumbent entry into new industries has been the subject of various 
studies (Adner, 2002; Christensen, 1997). Yet some of the theories and empirical findings 
are difficult to reconcile. For example, if market pioneering is advantageous (Robinson et 
al., 1994; Schmalensee, 1982), why do numerous empirical studies show initial low entry 
rates followed by a massive wave of entry (Geroski, 1995; Klepper, 2002)? Why would 
firms rush to enter a market  when presumably the most attractive niches are already 
occupied by the early entrants? The presence of uncertainty and the fact that firms imitate 
each other under uncertainty (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006) can serve as the reconciliation 
link. Firms may imitate because they think that the first movers got it right and the 
market has potential, from which even later entrants can profit or they may imitate 
because of legitimacy concerns. The differences can give rise to distinct imitation 
patterns, which subsequently can answer questions about the path of diffusion of a new 
market or an innovation. 
 Scholars from different areas have studied extensively imitation (Lieberman and 
Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). Sudharshan et al. (2006) even call it the best 
strategic response to the optimal introduction of a new generation product by a 
competitor. Many researchers (see Lieberman and Asaba 2006 for an overview) have 
argued that uncertainty about the adoption of innovations can result in imitative behavior.  
The major contribution of the current study is the documentation of varied 
imitative behavior across distinct groups of firms. While prior research has looked at 
whom firms imitate, suggesting that firms follow their peers (Haunschild, 1993; Kraatz, 
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1998), the most successful or the largest firms (Haveman, 1993), their legitimacy-based 
group (Barreto and Baden Fuller, 2006), or different group leaders (Sudharshan et al., 
2014), we ask whether the motivation for imitation depends on the type of imitating firm. 
If distinct groups of firms exhibit different imitative behavior due to diverse motivations, 
then understanding the phenomenon would be useful in mapping the spread of an 
innovation. We start by first addressing what might be the main drivers of the imitative 
behavior of companies – a topic of the overview studies by Lieberman and Asaba (2006) 
and Ordanini et al. (2008). Then we focus the study on the following question: “Are there 
any differences between distinct types of firms in terms of their motivations to imitate in 
the context of market entry?”  
 Ordanini et al. (2008) investigated a variety of literature streams to understand the 
reasons why firms imitate. The two over-arching rationales that emerged from their 
detailed review are: risk reduction and search for effectiveness. These two rationales have 
a natural linkage to the well-established management literature concepts of legitimacy 
and efficiency. We follow the approach of Tolbert and Zucker (1983) linking legitimacy 
to mimetic isomorphism as firms perceive an innovation the more legitimate the wider it 
spreads. Since greater legitimacy reduces the risk of failure, firms imitate in pursue of 
legitimacy. On the other hand, firms may imitate because of profit driven motives of 
improved efficiency. 
A few studies have studied legitimacy and efficiency together (Lieberman and 
Asaba, 2006) and, in the context of order of entry, studied when one motivation is more 
important than the other (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997). While these 
two motivations are not mutually exclusive, in any one scenario, one motivation 
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dominates over the other. In our present research we empirically evaluate if imitation in 
online market entry is affected by any of these two concepts. We also evaluate whether 
the roles of legitimacy and efficiency might have different prominences in contexts other 
than order of entry. 
Prior studies have equated efficiency with economic factors influencing adoption 
and legitimacy with institutional factors. That is, firms motivated by efficiency do not 
imitate, but only look at the profit potential of an innovation adoption. In the context of 
our study, we claim that based on differences in firm and strategic characteristics, 
companies would exhibit different imitation motives. To that extent, we agree with 
Kennedy and Fiss (2009) that social motives can co-exist with economic ones and we go 
a step further by applying Ordanini et al.’s (2008) framework that imitation (which has 
traditionally been considered as a social motivation for adoption) can also have economic 
drivers. 
We situate our study in the retailing industry and the adoption of the Internet as a 
transaction channel. New industries typically emerge with new technologies and while 
they can open up market opportunities, they are also associated with great risk for 
incumbents. The emergence of the Internet presented such a situation to the retailing 
industry where the availability of a new technology created a new market – e-commerce. 
The U.S. online retail industry sales grew from $ 42 billion in 2002 to $ 53 billion in 
2003 (an increase of 26%), and to $ 210 billion in 2013 (a much slower average growth 
of 13% during 2003-2013) [http://www.statista.com/statistics/273424/retail-e-commerce-
sales-in-the-united-states].  While this gives an overview of the online retail industry as a 
whole, a more granular view is obtained once we see the market shares of the clicks only 
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vs. the bricks and clicks categories of players in the online retail industry. The ‘clicks 
only’ sellers had a 42.3% market share and the ‘bricks and clicks’ sellers accounted for 
57.7% of the market in 2012. 
[http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collateral/united-states/2013-us-online-
retail-sales-forecast.pdf].  
During the early years, the future of the Internet for online retailing excited 
companies because of the profit potential of this channel. Such excitement was however 
dampened to a fair degree by the uncertainties associated with this novel mode of 
operations. Thus, many retailers embraced the “wait and see” approach that researchers 
have found to be typical of incumbents (Giarratana, 2008). But who waited, how much 
and what did they see? 
The main questions we ask in our study are whether legitimacy and efficiency 
motivations can be distinguished empirically and whether these vary across different 
groups of retailers. Based on theoretical arguments discussed in the body of the article, 
we claim that the two imitation motivations can be distinguished by the slope of the 
effect of the number of prior adopters on the probability of online entry. For the purpose 
of estimating the effects, we gather an empirical sample of almost 500 US retailers. We 
develop a quantitative model to determine whether the probability of adopting e-
commerce is significantly affected by the phenomenon of more and more firms entering 
the online market and whether the effect is different across heterogeneous firms. We split 
the sample into distinctive groups based on the extensive studies of these firm and 
strategic characteristics in the management and marketing literatures –de novo entry, firm 
size, scope, ownership, and channel fit. We do observe different effects across distinct 
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retailer types. Such knowledge is important because imitation patterns across diverse 
group of firms ultimately determine the spread of an innovation. Our study contributes to 
the overlooked topic of the potential pool of adopters and demonstrates how imitation is 
contingent on the different circumstances of a firm. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical 
background for our study. In section 3 we draw from this theoretical framework to 
develop a set of hypotheses. In sections 4 and 5, we describe the details of our empirical 
data that we use to test our theory as well as our modeling methodology. Section 6 
provides the results of our analysis. In section 7, we summarize our findings and discuss 
their implications. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The subject of imitation has been discussed extensively in a variety of literatures. 
Ordanani et al. (2008) have done a very good integrative summary of these streams of 
literature. We draw on this hereafter to develop the focus of our theoretical framework 
for understanding imitation in the backdrop of e-commerce adoption. 
 Ordanini et al. (2008)’s review spans about six different streams of research. 
What is particularly interesting to readers is that the driving forces of these streams in 
fact represent a continuum. At one end is the Neo-institutional Theory and Mimetic 
Isomorphism literature; the primary driving force here is uncertainty, which relates to an 
end point of risk reduction. Towards the other end is the Decision-making literature with 
its thrust tending towards search for effectiveness. In between in this continuum are other 
8 
 
literatures such as Industrial Organization where the purposes of imitation center on the 
smoothing of rivalry competition. In this context it is worth noting that the review article 
on imitation by Lieberman and Asaba (2006) had identified the concepts of rivalry and 
information as the drivers of imitation by firms. However we believe that the subsequent 
review by Ordanini et al. (2008) is more comprehensive in scope and its range subsumes 
concepts such as rivalry and information among others. Therefore we agree with 
Ordanini et al. that the two over-arching rationales for imitation are risk reduction and 
search for effectiveness. 
 If we look a bit more closely at the imitation literature streams positioned towards 
the two ends of the continuum, we see how risk reduction and search for effectiveness 
can map on to the concepts of legitimacy and efficiency. Diffusion of new technologies 
among companies is also generally assumed to be guided by these two main motives 
(Grewal et al., 2001). The Mimetic Isomorphism theory for instance, says that in the face 
of environmental uncertainty firms imitate to gain legitimacy in their field of operation 
(Oliver, 1997). Our present research focuses on the scenario where the nascent field of 
online selling had clearly created a situation of environmental uncertainty -- a fertile 
condition for encouraging firms to think about the importance of legitimacy. 
 On the other hand some theories from the Organization Learning perspective, 
conclude that firms observe the advantages and disadvantages that previous firms derived 
from their actions (in our research’s context, an example of such an action will be the 
entry of certain firms into the online market with other firms watching to see how that 
turned out), assess them and then imitate them or not (Baum and Ingram, 1998; Feldman, 
2000). Ordanini et al. (2008) also mention that the central thought from the Decision 
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Making literature is that if the decision process is expensive, imitation maybe an 
attractive option from the perspective of efficiency (Pingle, 1995). The evolving online 
market with its many new variables and situations exemplifies a situation where it would 
make sense for certain firms to decide to imitate in their search for enhancing efficiency. 
In view of the above discussions, we utilize the two over-arching themes of 
legitimacy and efficiency to investigate the imitative behaviors of online firms. On the 
basis of this framework we evaluate how different categories of companies might be 
primarily driven by one or the other of these two motives to imitate and adopt e-
commerce.  
 Next we briefly review some articles that talk about the two key concepts of 
legitimacy and efficiency; we also discuss how these two drivers might lead to different 
patterns of adoption – i.e., in the context of online market entry due to imitation. 
Following that we develop the logic for a series of hypotheses where certain firm types 
are likely to imitate due to legitimacy motivations while other categories could rely on 
efficiency motivation for imitation.   
 
2.1. Legitimacy 
Ordanini et al. (2008) suggest that in times of environmental uncertainty, firms 
imitate others to gain legitimacy. Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other 
researchers, e.g., (Westphal et al., 1997). In fact this link between environmental 
uncertainty, risk reduction and legitimacy is a part of institutional theory. 
Institutional theory lays emphasis on the role of social factors in driving 
organizational action (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997). These forces 
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are external to the organization and compel a firm to conform to what is the social norm, 
or what is normally accepted as the legitimate practice. The pressure to adopt in this case 
is external and may come from parent organizations, social pressure from other 
organizations with ties to the focal organization, as well as the wider environment (Burns 
and Wholey, 1993; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995). These institutional forces lead 
to an isomorphic behavior where all firms start behaving in a similar fashion, with the 
result that they adopt business practices that are identical to each other (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). Over time, organizations become similar to one 
another without necessarily becoming more efficient (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 Tendency to imitate increases in the number of adopters of the innovation (Burns 
and Wholey, 1993; Chaves, 1996; Fligstein, 1991; Kraatz, 1998; Palmer et al., 1993; Rao 
et al., 2001). If a practice is common among peers, then it must be a credible practice. 
That is, an innovation is legitimate to the extent that relevant actors regard it as the 
standard way to do business. However, if very few firms adopt a practice, then it can 
hardly be called the standard way to do business. A practice would become the standard 
in an industry as more and more firms adopt it, i.e., legitimacy can only increase in the 
number of firms. Further, prior adopters increase isomorphic pressures as additional 
adopters increase the illegitimacy of non-adoption (Terlaak and Gong, 2008).  
 Rhee et al. (2006) discuss how organizations expect to gain social legitimacy 
through imitation under environmental uncertainty. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue 
that organizational attempts to deal rationally with uncertainty lead to isomorphic 
structures. In a related discussion, Rao et al. (2001) argue that the strongest test of social 
proof is to see if recent adoptions increase the rate of subsequent adoptions. Given that 
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conforming to social norms is closely related to the concept of legitimacy, we would 
argue that increasing rate of adoptions would be an indicator of legitimacy being the 
motive. In our present research, we are looking at the entrance of firms in the early years 
of online retailing. Since Internet retailing was a radical innovation, the period was 
marked by considerable uncertainty. For firms driven to imitate by legitimacy motives, 
associated adoption patterns should thus be expected to be increasing in density at an 
increasing rate. 
 We have already argued that when firms are driven by legitimacy motives, 
attractiveness of an innovation increases in the number of adopters (Rao et al., 2001).  To 
put it mathematically, attractiveness of adopting an innovation for a non-adopter is 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖, where D is the number of adopters, 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 are the response parameters and 𝜖𝜖 
captures all the unobservable factors that influence adoption of a new innovation. Since 
the basic concepts of legitimacy and imitation argue for a positive impact of density, the 
parameter Beta will be positive. If we assume that 𝜖𝜖 is distributed extreme value, then the 
probability of adopting a new innovation by a non-adopter would be  𝜋𝜋 = exp(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽) /(1 + exp(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)). To study how this probability varies as D varies, we study the first 
derivative, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋(1 − 𝜋𝜋). We can see that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
  will be positive for all values of D 
and therefore, as the density of adopters increases, the probability of adoption by a non-
adopter would also increase. To determine whether the probability increases at a 
increasing rate or decreasing rate, we calculate the second derivative,  
 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
= 𝛽𝛽2𝜋𝜋(1 − 𝜋𝜋)(1 − 2𝜋𝜋) 
This expression would be positive if 𝜋𝜋 < 0.5 and will be negative if 𝜋𝜋 > 0.5. We are 
interested in periods of high uncertainty, which in turn is always high when an industry is 
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new. At this time, probability of adoption is low, and therefore the second derivative 
would be positive. This indicates that during periods of high uncertainty, legitimacy 
motives will lead to adoption rates increasing in density at increasing rates. 
 
2.2. Efficiency 
In contrast to the legitimacy perspective, the efficiency perspective is driven by an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the innovation as perceived by the imitating firm. 
In other words, firms adopt an innovation because it improves the efficiency of their 
operations, and thereby positively impacts their profitability. In this situation, when 
confronted with a new process, a firm evaluates it in terms of its impact on its internal 
functioning (Aldrich, 1979; Utterbeck, 1971) and adopts it only if it yields technical 
value in terms of improved operational efficiency. While a firm learns of an innovation 
by observing other firms in the industry, the pressure to adopt in this case is internal to an 
organization. Whenever a new process or practice becomes available in the marketplace, 
firms evaluate it in economic terms to see if it can improve the functioning of the firm or 
can add value to the organization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) 
 A firm may not know its relative abilities and need experience to learn about 
them, or more generally firms may have some information about their abilities but gain 
additional information from experience (Jovanovic, 1982). Rather than learning the value 
of a new practice by adoption and experimentation, a firm learns by vicarious learning, 
i.e., learning by watching the actions of other firms (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; 
Levinthal and March, 1993; Terlaak and Gong, 2008). Vicarious learning therefore 
reduces search costs and substitutes for a firm's own experience. There is considerable 
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uncertainty involved in adopting a new practice and success with the new technology is 
not assured. Because of firms’ heterogeneity, some firms may need more observations in 
order to deduce if an innovation would be efficient. Therefore, information about the 
efficiency of a new practice should increase as the number of firms adopting it increases, 
but at a declining rate. This happens because of three reasons. First, we assume the law of 
the diminishing returns to information (Lenox and King, 2004) applies to vicarious 
learning. As more and more firms adopt a new technology, incremental information from 
the entry of similar actors declines as more of these actors enter. This is because the new 
information revealed by each new adopter is lower when many have adopted in the past 
(Rao et al., 2001).  
 Second, some firms adopt innovations with the hope that these innovations would 
help them differentiate and increase their profitability. Differentiation is one of the 
available strategies for firms to increase profitability (Porter, 1996). E-commerce created 
the expectation of a new profitable opportunity. However, as the number of firms 
adopting the Internet increased, the competition between the different entrants increased 
and any differentiating advantage decreased. Porter (1996) also stresses the relationship 
between differentiation and operational effectiveness, which involves performing similar 
activities better than the competition. As a feature becomes common among competitors, 
it becomes harder to explore effectiveness advantages leading to differentiation. This 
phenomenon is reflected in prior research (e.g., Abrahamson, 1996; Abrahamson and 
Fairchild, 1999) suggesting that as total adoptions of a practice increase, some firms 
begin to reject the practice because adoption no longer provides differentiation effects 
and hence no competitive advantage. Thus, if companies are motivated to imitate looking 
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to differentiate themselves, this motive is valid only when the adoption is relatively rare. 
When adoption becomes common, differentiation stops being a leading motive causing 
imitation rates to decline. Therefore the efficiencies conferred by the Internet channel 
gradually declined with increased entry beyond a certain point.  
 Third, as the number of firms adopting an innovation increases, the amount of 
data available about other firms' experiences with the innovation also increases. A firm 
may learn about other firms that have successfully adopted a new technology and it may 
also learn about firms that have adopted a new technology and then abandoned it after 
some time. A firm involved in vicarious learning would be quite interested to learn why 
some firms fail and others succeed. Fortunately, firms also have information about the 
traits of different firms that have experimented with the new technology. This allows a 
firm interested in learning why some firms succeed and others fail to correlate relevant 
firm traits, such as, firm size, etc. to success/failure. An increasing number of adopters 
allows the relationship between firm characteristics and success/failure to be measured 
with greater certitude (Terlaak and Gong, 2008). As the number of firms adopting an 
innovation increases, the pool of potential adopters for whom the innovation would be 
useful declines as some potential adopters would learn from the experience of others that 
the new innovation is not for them. Therefore, we expect that the value of an innovation 
should increase with the number of firms adopting it but at a decreasing rate. 
 We have argued that when firms are driven by efficiency motives, attractiveness 
of an innovation increases in the number of adopters at a decreasing rate (Lenox and 
King, 2004).  To put it mathematically, the attractiveness of adopting a new innovation  
for a non-adopter is 𝛼𝛼 + ln (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽) + 𝜖𝜖, where D is the number of adopters, 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 (𝛽𝛽 >0) are 
15 
 
the response parameters and 𝜖𝜖 captures all the unobservable factors that influence 
adoption. If we assume that 𝜖𝜖 is distributed extreme value, then the probability of 
adopting a new innovation by a non-adopter would be 𝜋𝜋 = exp(𝛼𝛼 + ln (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)) /(1 +exp(𝛼𝛼 + ln (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))). To study how this probability varies as D  varies, we study the first 
derivative, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝜕𝜕(1−𝜕𝜕)
𝜕𝜕
. We can see that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
  will be positive for all values of D and 
therefore, as the density of adopters increases, the probability of adoption by a non-
adopter would also increase. To determine whether the probability increases at a 
increasing rate or decreasing rate, we calculate the second derivative,  
 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
= −2𝜕𝜕2(1−𝜕𝜕)
𝜕𝜕2
 
Since 𝜋𝜋  lies between 0 and 1, this expression would be negative for all values of 𝜋𝜋.  This 
indicates that efficiency motives will result in adoption rates increasing in density at 
decreasing rates. 
 
2.3 Risk Propensity 
While legitimacy and efficiency are quite distinct concepts and have been developed in 
varying streams of past research, there is still at least one external variable that is linked 
to both these concepts. This relates to the concept of risk propensity of the firms and it 
affects legitimacy and efficiency in different ways. Diffusion theory postulates that 
adoption decisions are based on differences in firms’ risk propensity (Rogers, 1983).  
However, the legitimacy and efficiency arguments imply two different types of risk.  In 
the first case, the risk is related to not-imitating – firms that do not follow their legitimacy 
based group are at risk of losing their legitimacy, which eventually results in failure.  
This means that non-imitation is perceived as a threat and firms imitate in order to avoid 
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the threat of being illegitimate.  Consequently, the majority of the imitators would have a 
lower propensity for risk.  On the other hand, a firm imitating for efficiency reasons is 
driven by the opportunity to improve its performance.  In this case, imitators would have 
higher propensity for risk.  This is precisely the reason why studying imitation behavior 
in different groups of firms is important.   
 Massini et al. (2005) describe a similar scenario when they differentiate between 
innovators and imitators.  The firms they refer to as imitators anchor their behavior in the 
prevailing behavior of their reference group, i.e. they start imitating when an innovation 
becomes more common.  That would correspond to legitimacy motivations – firms are 
afraid not to be considered nonconforming to industry norms.  This means that imitation 
is a threat prevention strategy.  On the other hand, innovators anchor their aspirations in a 
group of innovators and they imitate the behavior of this small group.  Naturally, this 
type of opportunity seeking behavior is more prevalent in firms with lower propensity for 
risk. 
 
 
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Heterogeneity among firms and contingency approaches have a long history of interest 
among researchers. For example, Terlaak and Gong (2008) argue that while the value of 
some innovations is universal, the value of others would vary across firms. Since the 
value of innovations varies across firms, we would expect the motivations behind 
imitation to also vary across firms.  
17 
 
Our theoretical premise from the previous section of the paper suggests that 
legitimacy and efficiency could be considered as the two over-arching themes for 
imitative behavior. Since different firm types are heterogeneous in nature, it maybe that 
some categories of firms would place a greater emphasis on legitimacy as the driver for 
imitation while other firm categories might rely primarily on efficiency as a motivator. 
We classify firm types by considering several factors that have been extensively 
researched in the management and marketing literatures – de novo, firm size, firm scope, 
and firm ownership. De novo firms are more agile and have organic structures, which 
makes them better equipped for exploration as opposed to extant firms, which are caught 
in competency traps (Ganco and Agarwal, 2009; Levitt and March, 1988). Would fluidity 
and competency traps lead to different imitation motivations? Similar questions arise 
related to the distinction between generalists and specialists as organizational ecologists 
describe generalists as structurally more inert and specialists as more fluid and able to 
change faster (Ganco and Agarwal, 2009). Haveman (1993) finds that firms imitate large 
and profitable organizations, but Terlaak and Gong (2008) suggest that adoptions by 
small firms can be more informative. Might this mean that large companies have different 
motives to imitate? These are some of the questions that guide our hypotheses 
development below. 
 
3.1 De Novo vs. Extant Firms. 
There is a considerable body of literature in economics and organizations, which 
investigates the differences between de novo and extant firms (see overview in Ganco 
and Agarwal (2009)). According to this literature, de novo firms are more agile, less inert 
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and better equipped for exploration (Levinthal and March, 1993). Exploration activities 
are mostly undertaken in search for efficiency. On the other hand, several researchers 
cited in Barnett and McKendrick (2004) have argued that extant firms tend to resist 
radical technological changes and prefer instead to engage in incremental innovations. 
This behavior can be interpreted as a sign that in their estimates, the technical value of 
radical innovations is not high enough, or in other words, not likely to lead to increased 
efficiency.  
 Terlaak and Gong (2008) discuss how the inferential accuracy of observing prior 
adoptions may be contaminated by the symbolic adoption of a practice. That is, in the 
presence of institutional pressures, some firms may adopt for legitimacy reasons as the 
technical value of the adoption is low for them. However, in the case of de novo online 
retailers, symbolic adoption is meaningless. Since this is their only line of business, it can 
be assumed that de novo firms have fully adopted the technology and have done so 
because they perceive technical value in the adoption. They have the daunting task of 
both acquiring resources in a new environment and making long-term decision regarding 
how to allocate the secured resources (Dobrev and Gotsopoulos, 2010). We therefore 
expect that de novo firms would be driven predominantly by efficiency motivations1. An 
1 A few quotes from the book The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon exemplify the 
exploration/efficiency motivations behind the entry of one of the early de novo e-tailers in the online 
marketplace.  “Bezos interpolated from this that Web activity overall had gone up that year by a factor of 
roughly 2,300—a 230,000 percent increase. “Things just don’t grow that fast,” Bezos later said. “It’s highly 
unusual, and that started me thinking, What kind of business plan might make sense in the context of that 
growth?” … Bezos concluded that a true everything store would be impractical—at least at the beginning. 
He made a list of twenty possible product categories.... The category that eventually jumped out at him as 
the best option was books. They were pure commodities…. There were two primary distributors of books 
at that time, Ingram and Baker and Taylor, so a new retailer wouldn’t have to approach each of the 
thousands of book publishers individually. And, most important, there were three million books in print 
worldwide, far more than a Barnes & Noble or a Borders superstore could ever stock. … he investigated 
some of the earliest online bookstore websites, such as Book Stacks Unlimited … and WordsWorth … No 
one had yet figured out how to do a good job selling books over the Internet. As Bezos saw it, this was a 
huge, untapped opportunity.” (Stone, 2013, p.25-26) 
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extreme example of efficiency entry motivations is Overstock.com, which was launched 
in late 1999 with a business model of selling excess inventory (source: company 
website). This was the time when the first casualties of the dot com bust started 
appearing. Earlier that year, the famous Barron’s article “Amazon.bomb” had made a 
splash. While sentiments to the online channel were cooling, Overstock.com followed 
with a business model capitalizing on selling some of the discounted inventory of 
retailers going out of business. That kind of behavior was the exact opposite of 
legitimacy seeking motivations. 
In contrast, an extant firm may be driven by either legitimacy or efficiency 
motivations depending on its size, scope or competitive forces. For example, Borders’ 
online entry was driven by legitimacy concerns as the CEO at that time did not believe in 
the profitability of the online channel (Dunne et al., 2010). On the other hand, categories 
where consumer trust and product trial are important, extant firms tended to be among 
earlier entrants driven by efficiency motivations (Dinlersoz and Pereira, 2007). Hence, 
our hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Imitation by de novo firms is driven predominantly by efficiency motivations. 
 
3.2 Large Firms vs. Small Firms 
Barnett and McKendrick (2004) call size the single most important characteristic 
determining a firm’s ability to compete and survive. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim 
that large organizations are frequently imitated as their size proves that their strategies are 
successful. Large firms are subject to greater inertia and are generally slower in adopting 
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changes because of formalized behavior and reduced impetus to change (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). Large firms are also more insulated from competitive threats and for 
some time they may not recognize the need to adopt an innovation (Barnett and 
McKendrick, 2004). This means that they would need stronger motivations to adopt a 
radical innovation. In fact, because of their greater scale of operations , they have less 
concerns about market efficiency (Barnett and McKendrick, 2004; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).We would also argue that larger firms generally tend to be more visible in the 
landscape than smaller firms. This is because, given other things constant, larger firms 
are more likely to be connected to a large base of consumers and suppliers than smaller 
firms. In the middle of the Internet boom then, larger firms might feel the social pressure 
from these market players, who may be wondering why these firms are not participating 
in the new innovation. In other words we would argue that larger firms could be 
susceptible to legitimacy pressures because of this. In addition, the slack of resources 
found in larger firms helps them respond better to environmental change and take more 
risky actions (Baum and Shipilov, 2006), and thus they would be more likely to imitate 
due to legitimacy concerns. For all these above reasons, we feel that a firm may 
jeopardize its legitimacy by non-adoption. The previously mentioned example of Borders 
illustrates the attitude that many large retailers had regarding e-commerce adoption. 
Further, a CNET article from 1999 on Walmart’s e-commerce re-launch efforts asserts 
that it is imperative for land-based big retail chains to jump on the e-commerce 
bandwagon in order to defend their market shares (Junnarkar, 1999). In sum, we would 
argue that large organizations would imitate when they face legitimacy pressures. 
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 Small firms, on the other hand are more vulnerable to competitive threats and they 
may need to engage more often in explorative search. Because small firms have less 
slack, they are particularly interested in improving efficiency. Innovations can make a 
firm more efficient and profitable, but if not appropriate for a firm can also lead to losses, 
and therefore carry a level of risk (Milliken, 1987). While imitation reduces the level of 
perceived risk, firms still need to be careful how they evaluate the imitation option 
(Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). As legitimacy concerns may impose the adoption of an 
innovation of no particular technical value (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006), legitimacy 
imitation stands to carry more risks than efficiency imitation. Since smaller firms have 
fewer resources, they would be less inclined to take risky steps and consequently more 
likely to imitate due to efficiency considerations. In a study on the factors determining 
adoption of e-commerce by SMEs, Grandon and Pearson (2004) find that external 
pressures (i.e. legitimacy) are the least important among a number of factors. This leads 
to our second hypotheses: 
 
H2a:  Imitation by larger firms is driven predominantly by legitimacy 
motivations. 
H2b:  Imitation by smaller firms is driven predominantly by efficiency 
motivations. 
 
3.3 Generalists vs. Specialists 
In a study of learning from experience, Barnett et al. (1994) found that generalists are 
less likely to learn from experience than specialists. They conducted an empirical study 
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of Illinois Banks, where they found that for specialists, the return on average assets 
(ROAA) increased with experience, but for generalists there was no increase in return on 
average assets with experience. This argument can be extended in the following way. 
Based on the above cited studies, as the ROAA increased with experience for specialists, 
we can deduce that specialists learn with the goal of increasing efficiency. And if they 
learn from their own experience with this goal, then it might be expected that they would 
apply the same objective to vicarious learning. Specialists also have a narrow scope of 
operations, which would mean that they would be more selective as to whom and why 
they imitate. It might be easier to infer the technical value of an innovation since 
specialists could very easily identify the competitors that are closest to them in a 
population of adopters. In this way, they would be able to collect more precise 
information about the outcome of prior adoptions. An interesting example is 
PartsAmerica.com, which was launched in 2000 as a partnership of two offline 
competitors – CSK Auto and Advance Auto Parts. Cooperation between competitors is 
not observed often and it is usually driven by efficiency considerations. 
According to niche width theory, generalists cannot respond fast enough in 
fluctuating environments to operate efficiently, because they operate in several markets 
and adjusting their structures takes a lot of time and resources (Baum and Shipilov, 
2006). Ingram and Baum (1997) also found that generalists are less likely to learn from 
experience than specialists. Combining these findings suggests that generalists by and 
large might be less susceptible to imitation. Generalists are less interested in learning 
because of their structure, which is composed of many units (Levinthal and March, 
1993). As opposed to specialists, generalists might have a harder time to infer the 
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technical value of an innovation as they would have to examine a much broader scope of 
adopters. Because of the difficulties in extracting the technical value of an innovation, 
generalists would have less efficiency considerations in their imitation strategies. Based 
on the above discussion, we can only hypothesize that specialists would emphasize more 
efficiency motives in their imitation decisions. We test this hypothesis for online 
retailers: 
   
H3:  Imitation by specialists is driven predominantly by efficiency motivations. 
 
3.4 Public Firms vs. Private Firms 
Publicly traded firms are answerable to shareholders who are susceptible to media reports 
about online entry by other firms. These external, social factors play a greater role in the 
adoption patterns of publicly traded firms and therefore they are more likely to be driven 
by legitimacy motivations (Westphal et al., 1997). Even if a public firm sees no 
operational advantage in adopting an innovation, the need to satisfy stakeholders may 
compel it to adopt the innovation. The earlier mentioned example of Borders’ online 
adoption is suitable also in this case, because company shareholders were not happy with 
Borders’ delayed response to Amazon’s and B&N’s online entries. 
A private firm is answerable to no external agency and therefore under little 
pressure to conform to the external environment in terms of cognitive legitimacy 
pressures. On the other hand, as private firms are likely to have more restricted sources of 
capital, efficiency considerations would be more important to them (George, 2005). 
Therefore, we believe that in the online retailing industry also, privately held firms are 
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more likely to imitate due to efficiency motivations. An example is fast-fashion retailer 
Forever 21. It entered the online channel relatively late – in 2003. But it follows an 
interesting strategy which matches its international store expansion with its website 
expansion. In different countries, the retailer operates different websites. Thus, for the 
Chinese market it may follow Chinese retailers and for the Indian market, it may follow 
Indian retailers. Such a strategy is more easily explainable from the efficiency 
perspective rather than legitimacy pressures. To that extent we formulate the following 
two hypotheses: 
 
H4a: Imitation by public firms is driven predominantly by legitimacy motivations. 
H4b: Imitation by private firms is driven predominantly by efficiency 
motivations. 
 
 
3.5      Product Fit to the Internet 
The early years of the Internet were marked by an irrational exuberance when all online 
retailers were supposed to realize untold riches. As firms gained greater experience with 
the Internet, they realized that the Internet is just another distribution channel that is more 
appropriate for some product categories than others. Marketing researchers have 
conducted some research to identify categories that are suitable for online retailing. An 
early study of online purchasing behavior (Bhatnagar et al., 2000) suggested that the 
Internet is less suited for products that are technologically complex, are expensive, have 
higher ego-related needs, and where touch and feel is more important. They conducted an 
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empirical study across eighteen product categories and found that consumer willingness 
to buy online varies widely across these categories in accordance with their hypotheses.  
Using the marketing definition of products as bundles of attributes, Lal and Sarvary 
(1999) classified attributes as digital and non-digital. Digital attributes are ones that can 
be communicated over the Internet at very low costs, and therefore consumers are more 
likely to purchase products online that are high on digital attributes. It can be then argued 
that the technical value of retailing on the Internet is likely to vary across product 
categories. If a firm does not retail products that have a good fit to the Internet, but still 
sets up an Internet based store, then it cannot be doing so to harness the technical value of 
the Internet. Such a firm probably adopts the Internet channel to appear to be legitimate. 
For example, high end designer labels resisted the online channel and they had to struggle 
with the inherent obstacles of e-commerce for a luxury brand and the risk of being 
perceived as out of touch with the times. Gucci is considered a pioneer in e-luxury and it 
launched its store in 2001. Two of the most defining characteristics of luxury brands are 
the richness of the shopping experience and exclusivity, both of which a very difficult to 
re-create or control online. While an online sale may increase short term profitability, its 
long term effect is questionable in view of the shopping experience and exclusivity. 
However, the presence of major luxury brands online raises the stakes for other brands 
for which it would be risky to be considered laggards. Thus, it is very likely that e-luxury 
as an example of poor channel fit is driven by legitimacy motivations.  
 
H5:  Imitation by firms with poor fit to the Internet is driven predominantly by 
legitimacy motivations. 
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4. DATA 
 
We collected the data from a number of public sources. Initially, we looked at the 
Hoover’s database (www.hoovers.com). From there, we extracted a list of brick and 
mortar firms that belonged to the “Retail Industry” category. Next from this list we 
excluded international retailers, wholesalers and distributors, equipment renting retailers, 
gas stations, jewelers, subsidiaries, and publishing houses. After we had a list of brick 
and mortar stores, we checked for each firm, whether they had an online store or not. For 
those firms that had an online store, in the next step we determined the date of entry into 
the online channel. The adoption is defined as the point in time when a retailer starts 
transacting with customers over the Internet. The setting up of an informational web page 
does not constitute an adoption. The adoption dates were obtained from company 
websites, annual reports, and the Lexis-Nexis business news database. This is a 
comprehensive collection of news stories from media sources around the world. After 
excluding sixteen firms for which we could not verify the adoption date, we arrived at a 
final sample size of three hundred and twenty three extant retailers. The earliest a firm 
had setup an online store was in January 1995. Our coverage period is from January 1995 
to March 2003. Figure 1 shows a histogram of e-commerce entry by year. 
The issue of efficiency vs legitimacy is relevant mainly during the introduction 
stage of the new innovation. During this stage, product/technology is brand new and 
untested; therefore uncertainty is very high. By the time a new product/technology 
reaches the growth stage, the product/technology has been accepted and uncertainties 
reduced substantially. While sales grow rapidly during both the stages, during the 
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introduction stage, sales grow at an increasing rate, and during the growth stage at a 
decreasing rate. When we study the US e-commerce growth rate, we find that it peaked in 
2002 and then started falling down. Therefore, it is safe to say that in 2002, US e-
commerce passed from the introduction to growth stage. We therefore stopped data 
collection in March 2003, as our primary focus is on the introduction stage of e-
commerce. 
We followed a similar procedure for information on entry of de novo entrants. 
The initial list of de novo entrants was obtained from Bizrate.com in 1998. This is when 
the data first became available on the Bizrate portal. This is a comprehensive shopping 
portal, which has been quoted as a reliable source of online retail data in a number of 
studies (e.g. Pan et al., 2002; Srinivasan and Moorman, 2005). This list of de novo firms 
was updated every year after that till 2003. A study of the state of e-retailing in 2000 
indicated that the top 100 e-tailers  accounted for more than 80% of online retailing 
traffic (Engel, 2001) and these retailers are present in our database. The above data 
sources as well as prominent web sites and newsletters tracking e-commerce failures 
(f**kedcompany.com, thedailydeal.com) at that time gave us information about the firms 
that exited the online space.  
There were 497 firms in the final sample. Descriptive statistics of the sample are 
presented in Table 1. There were 323 firms that have existing brick and mortar operations 
and there were 174 de novo firms that did not exist prior to setting up online stores. These 
firms were brand new businesses. There were 254 firms that were publicly listed and 243 
firms that had private ownership. 113 firms were large and the remaining firms were 
classified as small. The total number of generalist firms is 151 and that of specialist firms 
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is 346. The number of firms that were selling products that were identified to have a good 
fit with the Internet was 169. 
 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The dependent variable is the probability of adoption of the online channel for 
commercial purposes by retailers.  
 The density effect is captured by the total number of competitors at any point of 
time. To determine the total number of competitors existing in the online marketplace at 
any point of time, we determined the cumulative number of firms that had entered the 
online marketplace and the total number of online firms that had exited the online market 
till that point. The difference between these two terms gave us the number of online retail 
firms at any point between January 1995 and March 2003.  
The Hoover’s database provides information about whether a firm is publicly 
traded or not, whether a firm has a physical store, catalog or a TV channel, and retail 
categories. We visited the website of each of the retailers to obtain a list of the product 
categories sold by them. If a firm sold only one product category, we classified the firm 
as specialist, but if it sold more than one category, we classified the firm as generalist. 
For size, we collected yearly data whether the retailers belonged to the top 100 retailers 
published by Chain Store Age – the leading publication of the retail industry. We also 
analyzed the product categories to examine whether the product categories sold by a 
retailer are suitable for retailing online or not. Firms that sold software and music were 
classified as suitable for the Internet because these products are digital products (Lal and 
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Sarvary, 1999) that can be distributed via the Internet. This eliminates the shipping cost 
from not only the store to the consumer, but also from the manufacturer to the retailer 
leading to substantial price savings. Firms that sold books and computer hardware were 
also classified as suitable for the Internet because these are standardized products where 
touch and feel is not relevant. We also believe that consumers will prefer buying gift 
items over the Internet. Quite often, the gift-giver after making a shopping trip to 
purchase a gift has to bring the gift home to wrap it and then make another trip to the post 
office to mail the gift. All these steps can be avoided by buying gifts over the Internet as 
the Internet firm takes over the task of wrapping and shipping the gift.  
To control for economic indicators, we use Nasdaq and the consumer price index. 
We would like to emphasize that these variables are not particularly of interest in the 
context of the phenomenon of imitation which is the primary focus of our current 
research. However we feel that since they are likely to affect online retail adoption, it 
makes sense to include these as control variables; since we consider these as control 
variables, we do not have any hypotheses associated with them.  
  
[Please insert Table 1 here]  
 
5. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The dependent variable is the probability that a firm will open an online store. This 
probability would depend on the attractiveness of the online environment. Let the 
attractiveness of opening an online store for firm i be 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. The first term captures the 
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role of those variables that can be observed by the researcher and the second term the role 
of unobserved random terms.  Ai would depend on a number of factors, such that, 
 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = Δ�.𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤� + 𝑑𝑑.𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒         
Here, 𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤�  is a vector of all those factors that determine the attractiveness of online 
marketplace for firm i, and Δ� is a vector of corresponding parameters. D is the density of 
online firms, i.e., total number of online firms. This is the difference between all the firms 
that have setup online stores and the total number of firms that have exited the online 
marketplace. If the parameter e is 1, then the relationship is linear. If e is greater than 1, 
then the attractiveness of opening an online store is increasing at an increasing rate in 
density and if it is positive but less than 1, then it is increasing at a decreasing rate in 
density. The relationship between attractiveness of online store and density is non-linear. 
The random term is assumed to have standardized normal distribution, i.e., 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1). 
The retailer will open the online store if the attractiveness of  the online marketplace 
exceeds some threshold value, that can be assumed to be zero without loss of generality.  
 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > 0 
 Δ�.𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤� + 𝑑𝑑.𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > 0 
 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > −(Δ�.𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤� + 𝑑𝑑.𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒) 
Under these assumptions, the probability that a firm would open an online store would be 
given by the standard probit probability, 
 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = ∫ 1√2𝜕𝜕 𝑒𝑒−𝑥𝑥2∞−𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑        (2) 
The sample log-likelihood is maximized to determine the value of the different 
parameters. The sample log-likelihood function is non-linear in density, and therefore the 
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log-likelihood cannot be estimated by standard statistical software. A maximum 
likelihood routine was written to maximize the likelihood by iterative techniques. 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
We first carried out the analysis for extant brick and mortar firms and de novo firms. The 
results of estimation on brick and mortar firms are in Table 2A and the results of 
estimation on de novo firms are in Table 2B. For both the extant and de novo firms, the 
Nasadq has no impact on a firm's decision to retail online. On the other hand, both the 
extant and de novo firms are positively influenced by consumer price index. Extant firms 
are not influenced by density. De novo firms on the other hand, were influenced 
positively by density (p<.04). The < 1 value of the exponent shows that de novo firms 
were driven primarily by a desire to improve efficiency of their operations. This supports 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
[Please insert Tables 2A and 2B here]  
 
 To test Hypothesis 2a and 2b the data was split into two samples. One sample 
consists of large firms and the other sample consists of small firms. Results of calibrating 
the quantitative model on large firms are reported in Table 3A and the results of 
calibrating on small firms are reported in Table 3B. In the case of large firms, the 
parameters of Nasdaq and CPI are insignificant showing that neither of these factors play 
a role in large firms' decisions to setup online operations. The parameter of density is 
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positive and significant. The exponent coefficient is positive, greater than one and 
marginally significant. This indicates that large firms are driven by legitimacy motives in 
imitating other firms. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported. For small firms, both the 
consumer price index (CPI) and the Nasdaq are again insignificant, density has a positive 
influence on online entry. The exponent coefficient is positive and less than one 
indicating a concave relationship between density and attractiveness of the Internet for 
retailing. Thus as more and more competitors start retailing online, the probability of 
retailing on the Internet declines. This supports hypothesis 2b that imitation in small 
firms is driven mainly by efficiency motives. 
 
[Please insert Tables 3A and 3B here]  
 
 We next tested Hypothesis 3 by dividing all the firms into categories, one of all 
the generalist firms and the other of specialist firms. The quantitative model was tested 
separately on  the two groups of firms; empirical results from generalist firms are 
reported in Table 4A and results from specialist firms in Table 4B. Generalist firms are 
influenced by the Nasdaq, but not by the total number of online firms that have already 
started selling online. Therefore, overall generalist firms do not seem to imitate other 
firms. On the other hand specialist firms are positively influenced by the Nasdaq, the 
consumer price index and density. The significant positive coefficient of density indicates 
that specialist firms are imitating. The exponent of density is positive and less than one. 
Therefore, the rate of online entry by specialist firms are increasing but at a decreasing 
rate. These findings support Hypothesis 3. 
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[Please insert Tables 4A and 4B here] 
 
We next tested Hypotheses 4a and 4b by splitting the sample based on the 
ownership of the firm, i.e., public firms and private firms. Results of calibrating the 
quantitative model on private firms are reported in Table 5A and results of calibrating on 
public firms are reported in Table 5B. A careful study of Table 5A would show that 
private firms are influenced by both the Nasdaq and the consumer price index. The 
coefficient of density is positive and significant, indicating that private firms are 
influenced by entry decisions of other firms. The exponent of the density term for private 
firms is positive and significant and also less than one. This indicates that private firms 
are driven by a desire to improve the operational efficiency of their business. Public firms 
are also positively influenced by both the Nasdaq and the consumer price index. The 
coefficient of density is again positive indicating the role of imitation in the decision-
making of public firms. The exponent of density is positive and greater than 1. This 
indicates a convex (increase at an increasing rate) relationship between density and 
attractiveness of entering online retail space. Therefore, public firms are driven a by a 
desire to appear legitimate when they imitate other firms that have already entered the 
online marketplace. The findings of this analysis confirm Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
 
[Please insert Tables 5A and 5B here] 
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 To test the last hypothesis, the sample was divided into two sub-groups based on 
whether the products that a firm sells have a good fit with the Internet channel. The 
quantitative model was first calibrated on the firms that sell products that have a good fit 
with the Internet and the results of this empirical analysis is reported in Table 6A. The 
quantitative model was also tested on those firms that do not sell products with a good fit 
to the Internet; these results are shown in Table 6B. We find that both types of firms are 
not influenced by either Nasdaq or consumer price index. What is interesting is that both 
kinds of firms are not influenced by the density of online firms in their decision to setup 
online retail operations. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was not supported by our data.  
[Please insert Tables 6A and 6B here]  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In our present research we were motivated to develop an understanding of what drove 
imitative behavior for companies that entered the online retail industry. We theorized 
legitimacy and efficiency would be the main drivers for imitation. However we also 
recognized that the online retail industry is not homogeneous in nature and includes firms 
who were positioned differently on the basis of infrastructure and specializations among 
other things. Given this situation, we hypothesized that the drivers of imitation would 
vary from one type of online retailer to another. Our empirical analysis does indicate that 
this is often the case. Our findings have both theoretical and managerial implications. 
Theoretically it answers the call by other academic researchers to do a systematic 
investigation of how and where imitation is happening in industry. Managerially, our 
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research has several points of value. First it identifies determinants of imitation for one of 
the most important industries of our era – the online retail industry. Second, it is possible 
to predict the degree of imitation in new markets like in Mobile Commerce. For instance 
if the emerging M-Commerce retail industry in some market is made up mainly of 
company types who are more likely to imitate driven by efficiency motivations, then an 
inefficient innovation is less likely to be adopted by those types of companies. An 
analogous thing is also likely to happen in company-markets where legitimacy is the 
major determinant of imitative behavior and thus of diffusion of innovation in that 
market. 
 We develop an econometric model where the parameters of the density 
dependence term would indicate if imitation was occurring or not. Our model is able to 
distinguish differences in imitating behavior among potential adopters. This was possible 
by examining the magnitude of the estimated exponent term associated with the density 
term of our model. 
We identified five different ways to classify firms based on existing theories in 
the management and organizations literatures and for each classification, developed 
hypotheses on how firms might behave. We then collected data about a broad spectrum 
of firms. The main data was whether a firm has an online store, and if yes then when was 
the online store set up. We also collected data about firm characteristics. We calibrated a 
non-linear probit model on the data to test the hypothesized relationships between firm 
characteristics and the probability of a firm entering online marketplace. The 
hypothesized relationships were for the most part empirically supported. We find that de 
novo online retailers were motivated by efficiency in their decision to follow in the steps 
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of earlier entrants. We also find that large retailers are motivated by legitimacy 
motivations, while smaller retailers are more likely to be driven by efficiency 
motivations. Specialist firms are motivated to imitate by efficiency motivations. We find 
that publicly traded companies are more susceptible to external legitimacy pressures and 
privately held companies are driven by efficiency considerations in imitation.  
 Naturally, an imitating firm would be pleased if their market performance is good 
following the implementation of the imitation strategy. If the performance is not good, 
firms driven by legitimacy or efficiency would both be unhappy but their reactions could 
be different. A firm driven by efficiency is likely to go back and examine where things 
may have gone wrong in their cost-benefit analysis calculations; their approach would be 
objective in nature. A firm driven by legitimacy is likely to feel immediate regret that 
they kind of blindly imitated since they were afraid because of legitimacy concerns; they 
may also want to think back about why they went wrong, but their approach is likely to 
be more subjective in nature since their reason to imitate was less rational to begin with 
than for firms who were driven by efficiency concerns. 
 Our theoretical development is compatible with our motivation in this research to 
show that whether legitimacy or efficiency was the primary motivator for imitation, 
varied from one category of online retailers to another. We would like to mention, 
though, that it is likely that for many retailers, both legitimacy and efficiency are drivers 
of online market entry; we have not explored this and therefore this is a limitation of our 
current research.  Another limitation of our study is the operationalization of product fit. 
Researchers consider products to be a bundle of attributes (Lancaster, 1990). Some 
attributes of a particular product may make the product better suited for the Internet while 
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other attributes of the same product might make it less suitable. This is probably why 
some empirical papers have found contradictory results. For instance, Bhatnagar et al. 
(2000) said technologically complex products are a poor fit for the Internet while Lal et 
al. (1999) said that digital products are a good fit. Consider the fact that computers are 
both technologically complex and possess digital attributes. This means that computers 
could be either a good fit or a bad fit for the Internet. Similar potential problems can exist 
for other products, and this is probably why we could not find support for our Hypothesis 
5. 
This research can be extended along a number of different ways. We focused on 
only two overarching motivations, but researchers have identified several different types 
of motivations (Lieberman and Asba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). Future research 
studies can examine the role of these different motivations at a much finer level. We 
included only three determinant factors, Nasdaq, consumer price index and density. There 
are a number of other economic and firm variables that can be included in the study to 
identify different types of influencers of adoptions; at this point we are using the random 
error term to capture these influences in an overall sense. We combined the total number 
of firms that have entered online market space and then exited into one density term. It is 
possible that these two variables provide different types of information, and thus better 
kept separate in the data and analysis. Among the firm categories we empirically 
evaluated, we found that the efficiency motive was more common than the legitimacy 
motive. Future research could use our econometric model to identify other firm 
categories where imitation was caused by legitimacy pressures. 
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Despite its limitations, the current study contributes to the literature on imitation 
behavior and online market entry in a number of ways. First, it responds to Lieberman 
and Asaba’s (2006) call for the challenging task of producing more empirical research on 
the identification of imitation processes “given the prevalence of business imitation and 
its potential consequences” (p. 381). It is essential for scholars and managers to 
understand how the type of imitation can ultimately affect market structure. If a 
population consists of a particular type of firms that are more likely to imitate driven by 
efficiency motivations, then an inefficient innovation is less likely to spread in such a 
population. On the other hand, if there are strong legitimacy pressures, it would be easier 
to predict which firms will follow next. Thus, understanding imitation motives can give 
us a better perspective on population dynamics both in terms of new market entry and 
adoption of innovations. 
Second, our study directs the attention to a somewhat overlooked topic in the 
diverse streams of literatures on inter organizational imitation – the pool of potential 
imitators. While previous studies have explored extensively whom firms emulate, little 
such effort has been undertaken regarding the imitators. Yet it is exactly the structure of 
this pool of imitators that eventually determines the diffusion trajectory. Also, 
investigating who the imitators are could give answers as to why some innovations 
adopted by big and successful companies get copied and others adopted by the same 
companies do not. 
Third, we demonstrate that imitation, as any other strategic decision and outcome 
is contingent on the particular circumstances of a firm. This is to say, that one-size-fits-all 
type of studies on imitative behavior may not reveal important information. For example, 
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both economic theory’s information cascades and organization theory’s neo-
institutionalism/mimetic isomorphism fail to explain the very often observed gradual 
decrease in adoption rates after a period of growth (Strang and Macy, 2001). Accounting 
for differences in imitation motives can also improve the inferential value of prior 
adoptions for managers in the framework of Terlaak and Gong (2008). Observing prior 
adopters who are more likely to imitate for efficiency reasons would give more credible 
signals to potential adopters. 
Finally we have looked at imitation and its drivers of legitimacy and efficiency in 
the context of one of the most monumental innovations in the late twentieth century – the 
advent of e-commerce.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Number of 
Firms 
Examples 
Extant Firms 
De novo Firms   
323 
174 
Costco, Kmart 
Carquest, Bluefly 
Private Firms 
Public Firms 
243 
254 
Books on Tape,  Big Y Foods 
Circuit City, Carson Pirie Scott & 
Co 
Large Firms 
Small Firms 
52 
445 
Neiman Marcus, Dillard's 
99 cents only stores, Ann Taylor 
stores 
Generalist Firms 
Specialist Firms 
151 
346 
Sears, Shopko 
Academy Sports & Outdoors, 
Carquest 
Firms with good channel fit 
Firms with poor channel fit 
169 
328 
Factory Card & Party Outlet, 
Staples 
Burlington Coat Factory, Big Y 
Foods 
 
 
45 
 
       TABLE 2A 
Parameter Estimates for Extant Firms  
Determinant Factors β 
Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 14.643 4.317 3.39 0.00 
Nasdaq .778 .673 1.15 0.25 
Consumer price index 8.776 2.805 3.12 0.00 
density .826 .657 1.25 0.21 
e .312 .218 1.42 0.16 
 
TABLE 2B 
Parameter Estimates for De novo Firms  
Determinant Factors β 
Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 5.637 3.219 1.75 0.08 
Nasdaq 1.216 .823 1.47 0.14 
Consumer price index 5.312 3.111 1.7 0.09 
density 1.117 .512 2.18 0.03 
e .692 .299 2.31 0.02 
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TABLE 3A 
Parameter Estimates for Large Firms  
 
Determinant Factors β 
Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 10.251 7.65 1.34 0.18 
Nasdaq 0.1532 0.09 1.76 0.08 
Consumer price index 2.315 2.09 1.11 0.27 
density 0.532 0.28 1.92 0.05 
e 1.321 0.75 1.76 0.08 
 
 
TABLE 3B 
Parameter Estimates for Small Firms  
Determinant Factors β 
Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 5.671 2.68 2.12 0.03 
Nasdaq 1.342 1.00 1.34 0.18 
Consumer price index 2.315 1.51 1.53 0.13 
density 4.341 1.87 2.32 0.02 
e 0.891 0.31 2.88 0.00 
 
 
  
47 
 
TABLE 4A 
Parameter Estimates for Generalist Firms  
 
Determinant Factors β Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 14.497 10.480 1.38 0.17 
Nasdaq -.789 .330 -2.39 0.02 
Consumer price index -8.487 6.752 -1.25 0.21 
density 1.523 1.290 1.18 0.24 
e 0.852 .624 1.36 0.17 
 
 
TABLE 4B 
Parameter Estimates for Specialist Firms  
 
Determinant Factors β 
Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 25.785 3.556 7.25 0.01 
Nasdaq 0.962 .107 8.96 0.01 
Consumer price index 4.216 2.326 1.81 0.07 
density 2.196 .450 4.88 0.01 
e .734 .138 5.3 0.01 
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TABLE 5A 
Parameter Estimates for Private Firms  
 
Determinant Factors β 
Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 12.566 3.376 3.72 0.00 
Nasdaq 0.859 0.103 8.33 0.00 
Consumer price index 8.142 2.221 3.66 0.00 
density 2.559 0.596 4.29 0.00 
e 0.941 0.147 6.40 0.00 
 
 
TABLE 5B 
Parameter Estimates for Public Firms  
 
Determinant Factors β 
Standard 
error 
z value p value 
Constant 15.275 4.823 3.16 0.00 
Nasdaq 0.785 0.140 5.60 0.00 
Consumer price index 9.854 3.099 3.17 0.00 
density 3.137 1.094 2.86 0.00 
e 1.362 0.603 2.25 0.02 
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TABLE 6A 
Parameter Estimates For Firms with good channel fit 
Determinant Factors β Standard error z value p value 
Constant 11.324 6.294 1.79 0.07 
Nasdaq .456 .385 1.18 0.24 
Consumer price index 7.018 4.131 1.69 0.09 
density 4.105 3.852 1.07 0.28 
e 1.813 1.726 1.05 0.29 
 
TABLE 6B 
Parameter Estimates For Firms with poor channel fit 
Determinant Factors β Standard error 
z value p value 
Constant 12.091 3.982 3.03 0.00 
Nasdaq .817 .622 1.31 0.19 
Consumer price index 2.997 2.610 1.14 0.25 
density 1.893 .631 3.00 0.00 
e 1.164 0.827 1.41 0.16 
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FIGURE 1 
Histogram of e-commerce adoptions by year 
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